Hamas and the specificity of leadership escalation | Politics

Despite the great and harsh loss suffered by Hamas with the martyrdom of its leader and head of its political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, may God have mercy on him, it was able, within just a few days, to elect a new president, with Yahya Sinwar “Abu Ibrahim” taking over the leadership as his successor.

This rapid transition was striking to many, especially in light of the great circumstances and challenges facing Hamas, whether in terms of the magnitude of the battle it is waging, the targeting of its leaders and institutions, or its deprivation of freedom of action in most Arab and international environments, the difficulty of communicating, meeting and moving, and maintaining secrecy and privacy; which makes implementing the Shura electoral process extremely difficult.

However, since its establishment, Hamas has enjoyed a cohesive organizational and consultative structure, and a flexible decision-making mechanism capable of adapting to the complex circumstances of occupation and siege inside Palestine, and the circumstances of dispersion and separation outside Palestine.

Factors affecting leadership advancement

  • Firstly: The religious, faith-based, and educational formation of the movement’s cadres and leaders contributed to facilitating the Shura electoral process to a great extent, which reduced the intensity of the rush to assume leadership positions, as leadership is considered a great responsibility and trust that must be fulfilled, with one being held accountable for it before God.
  • secondly: The internal Shura and electoral experience of the Muslim Brotherhood school, to which Hamas belongs, also had an impact on refining the movement’s experience and building on it.
  • Third: The clarity of the principles and ideological, intellectual, advocacy, political and struggle starting points contributed to the existence of common understanding rules among most cadres and leaders, which made the margins of leadership selection and differentiation limited, focusing on experience, competence and experimentation, as long as the program is almost the same.
  • Fourth: Hamas did not fall under the pressure of the “eternal leader,” the “lifelong president,” or the “sacred” leadership symbolism, and its regulations and dynamics allowed for holding everyone accountable, and even withdrawing confidence if necessary (even if that did not happen in practice).
  • Fifth: The adopted electoral mechanisms do not allow the leader to assume leadership for more than two consecutive terms (eight years). This mechanism applies to the head of the movement and to the heads of the regions or provinces (Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad). Even the members of the leadership themselves are not permitted to assume the same position for more than two consecutive terms. This mechanism has provided psychological readiness for the leaders to step down from their positions, move to other positions and responsibilities, or make room for leadership inheritance, prepare alternative leaders, and reveal new symbols.
  • Sixth: Perhaps what contributed to the “purification and filtering” of the electoral process and the escalation is that the leadership work in Hamas throughout the previous stage and until now is based on “the fine” and not the “gain”. Advancing to leadership in the conditions of working for Palestine and armed resistance work, confronting the Zionist project, and suffering from the hostility of the Arab regimes and the international system to the Islamic movement and the line of resistance, practically means sacrificing oneself, time and money, and perhaps becoming a leader for the sake of “martyrdom”; therefore, there is nothing to compete over from the “debris of the world”.
  • Seventh: Among the factors that helped the dynamism of the electoral process is that Hamas is a large, broad organization, full of talents and cadres in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and abroad; and that many of its senior leaders have remained well-known, influential and effective internally and have a role in decision-making, without necessarily being politically or mediatically known; which has given the movement a kind of internal safety valve and the ability to present these leaders to public prominence if necessary.

However, Hamas members are not a group of “angels,” and the points mentioned above mitigate leadership rivalry but do not necessarily eliminate it, nor do they prevent differences in efforts, priorities, and evaluation of men and their performance, and in giving greater or lesser weight to some criteria related to precedence in the movement, and to knowledge, competence, experience, personal harmony, geography, friction, and coexistence.

However, Hamas has overcome all its electoral entitlements since its establishment until now with a great deal of fluidity, and it quickly rallied around the new leader, even if there were efforts and differences within the framework of the Shura Council’s performance during the electoral process.

Hamas is perhaps one of the few organizations and factions in the Arab world that has passed all the electoral entitlements since its establishment until now in a regular and uninterrupted manner, despite being one of the most persecuted and hounded organizations and factions. This means that the electoral Shura process is authentic in its structure and composition.

Hamas leadership

In Hamas, great symbolism did not necessarily mean assuming executive work. For example, the personality of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his great symbolism as a founding leader and sponsor of the project did not necessarily mean that he would assume executive leadership of the movement, but he remained a “spiritual father” and an inspiration to the movement until his martyrdom, may God have mercy on him.

When Hamas declared itself in December 1987, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was present in the leadership, but the one who was managing the Gaza leadership office was Professor Abdul Fattah Dukhan, who also managed the interior office (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), an office that was subordinate to the Palestine apparatus headed by Professor Khairi al-Agha (who resided abroad), who in turn was subordinate to the leadership of the Bilad al-Sham organization in Jordan headed by Professor Abdul Rahman Khalifa.

From the formation of Hamas until 1993, Khairy al-Agha remained its first president inside and outside the country, until he resigned and was replaced by his deputy, Dr. Musa Abu Marzouq, who continued to lead until 1995 when he was forced to leave Jordan and did not find a suitable place to reside in the Arab world, so he returned to the United States where he was arrested. He was replaced by his deputy, Khaled Meshaal, who assumed the presidency of the movement in the following elections until 2017, when the decision was approved during his term to limit the president to two consecutive terms, and after him Ismail Haniyeh was elected with great consensus in the 2017 elections and in the second renewal in 2021.

Sinwar's election

When Haniyeh was martyred, his second term was about a year away, and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, had preceded him in martyrdom in early January 2024. Therefore, it was not surprising that attention turned to the movement’s leaders in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, and abroad, Khaled Meshaal. Since Meshaal had expressed his unwillingness to return to lead the movement several months before the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Sinwar was a natural candidate to lead the movement.

The centrality of the Gaza Strip in the resistance work and Hamas’s leadership of it, the Battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa that Hamas launched from the Strip, the heroic model presented by Gaza under Sinwar’s leadership, in the face of a brutal Zionist aggression and a global coalition of major powers, the state of consensus among Hamas at home and abroad to continue steadfastness and confrontation, and raising the level of defiance in the face of aggression following the assassination of Haniyeh… all of this was in the direction of electing Sinwar. Therefore, it is not surprising that there was an internal consensus on his selection.

Sinwar is a veteran and a senior leader in Hamas since the 1980s. He played a key role in forming the Da'wa Security Apparatus in 1983, led by Abd al-Rahman Tamraz. In 1986, Sinwar assumed the presidency of the “Majd” organization, which was formed as a striking military force affiliated with the security apparatus. Its mission was to resist corruption and corruptors, and then its missions branched out to resist agents and other things.

Sinwar was arrested in 1988 and sentenced to four life terms in prison. In prison, he held leadership positions, including the presidency of the Supreme Leadership Committee for Hamas Prisoners. He was released in the Wafa al-Ahrar deal in 2011. The following year, he was elected a member of the Hamas leadership in Gaza, and then elected Hamas leader in the Strip in the 2017 and 2021 terms.
Sinwar is known for his toughness, strong personality, serious, practical nature, and decision-making. His military and security inclinations and experience have contributed to his strong interest in this aspect, and his harmony with his brothers concerned with managing this work. This harmony was clearly evident during the Battle of “The Flood of Al-Aqsa.”

In general, the conclusion is that Hamas will continue its institutional work. It has previously lost senior leaders such as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Salah Shehadeh, Ibrahim al-Maqadmeh, Ismail Abu Shanab, Ahmed al-Jaabari, Jamal Mansour, Jamal Salim, and Yahya Ayyash. However, the movement has not declined, but rather has grown in strength and breadth over time.

Hamas is not a movement based on symbols or individuals, but on ideas, and its new leaders are building on the achievements of their predecessors. Therefore, the bets of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli occupation on weakening Hamas are wrong bets, and they have proven to be a failure.

Most likely, Haniyeh's martyrdom will give the movement more inspiration and motivation to continue the resistance project, and to follow in the footsteps of its martyrs and the martyrs of its people and nation.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera Network.

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