Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran and the attack on the Golan… America's scenarios to confront the escalation | Politics

The missile attack on the village of Majdal Shams in the occupied Golan Heights, which killed 12 people and injured 30 others, was an extension of the security repercussions that the region has been witnessing since the events of October 7, 2023. The attack raised regional and international fears of the expansion of the scope of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah to include repercussions throughout the region, despite the efforts made by a number of mediators to prevent the expansion of the scope of the war.

Between the expected action and reaction from both sides: Israel and Hezbollah, and against the backdrop of the Israeli attack on the southern suburb of Beirut yesterday, Tuesday, which killed 3 people and wounded 25, and in the context of the statements of US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin supporting Israel from the Philippine capital Manila, and the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of the political bureau of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas in Tehran today, we are trying through this space to provide some insight into the possibility of this incident turning into a comprehensive confrontation involving Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand and the United States and Israel on the other, by focusing on addressing Washington’s options to confront any potential escalation in the region, based on its commitment to Israel’s security.

The questions that arise here are: Does Washington have options that enable it to defend Israel directly in the event of a comprehensive confrontation without changing its foreign priorities at the strategic level, which are represented in besieging and containing China as a real competitor to its global influence on the one hand, in addition to waging an indirect war with Russia – the Ukrainian war – dreaming of restoring its lost imperial glory on the other hand?

Will expanding the scope of the war be the straw that breaks the camel's back of normalization as a strategic goal for Washington and Tel Aviv, if it was not already broken by the events of October 7? And what is the ability of the United States of America to move in this critical circumstance while it is preoccupied up to its toes with an electoral race that will determine whether it will remain a unified state that can play its role as a superpower, or whether it will slide into the fires of civil war due to societal division?

Election maneuver

The timing of the missiles launched at the occupied Syrian Golan Heights should be given considerable attention in any approach interested in understanding the real reasons for the escalation, which may have led the entire region into a confrontation with dire consequences. This strike came after the Israeli Prime Minister’s visit to America, a visit burdened with personal concerns and the isolation he is experiencing within Israeli society due to the repercussions of the Gaza war. Hamas was not destroyed as a target for this war, and the prisoners were not released.

His trip to Washington, from a political perspective, came at a time when his popularity had fallen dramatically, so the visit was an opportunity to present himself as a global statesman, respected by the highest legislative body of the world’s superpower, coupled with a major political disappointment; resulting from the announcement by the International Criminal Court that it was seeking to arrest him on the basis of possible war crimes in Gaza.

What is important in this context is that before leaving Tel Aviv for Washington, Benjamin Netanyahu deliberately embarrassed and pressured President Biden and behind him the voices of many Democrats calling for stopping the war and ending human suffering when he said: “I want to talk to Biden about continuing the war against Hamas, confronting other armed groups supported by Iran in the region, as well as releasing the detainees.”

It is worth noting here that Netanyahu and Biden have a tense relationship despite the latter's military and diplomatic support for Israel. As is known, the invitation to Netanyahu was officially extended by the Republican bloc that controls the House of Representatives, as the invitation came to him from Mike Johnson, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

We conclude from all that has been mentioned that Netanyahu's preferred choice in the American election season is the Republican Party and its presidential candidate, Donald Trump, and not the Democratic Party, which will be led by Kamala Harris as the party's potential candidate in the current presidential race. Anyone who looks at the statements of the Democratic candidate after her meeting with Netanyahu can sense this gap between him and the Democratic Party in its new version. Kamala stated after the meeting, saying: “We cannot ignore these tragedies, and we cannot allow ourselves to become indifferent to the suffering, and I will not remain silent.” The Gaza war and the position on it were among the reasons that contributed to the weakening of President Biden's popularity and his exit from the presidential race.

Based on what was mentioned at this point, I believe – as some do – that the party with an interest in launching rockets at the occupied Golan is Netanyahu, not Hezbollah. Another matter to support this hypothesis is what Amos Harel mentioned in his article entitled “The Mounting Pressure to Fight Hezbollah in Lebanon-and Why That Is So Dangerous,” which he published in the American Foreign Policy magazine on July 23, 2024, in which he indicated that the Israeli Defense Forces announced last June the approval of plans to launch a large-scale attack in southern Lebanon.

Scenarios

According to the available data and information, three scenarios can be indicated as options for America in dealing with this event:

First: The appeasement scenario

This is done by calling on both parties to the conflict to exercise self-restraint in order to avoid any escalation that could lead to a large-scale regional war whose effects would extend beyond Israel and Hezbollah, while preserving the right of both parties to a controlled response based on prior coordination, and historical experiences confirm the possibility of adopting it. Perhaps the recent coordination between Iran and the United States following Israel’s strike on the Iranian consulate building in Syria supports this.

Second: The scenario of continued support for Israel

This scenario depends on the continued flow of military support to Israel to help it confront any military and security repercussions resulting from a potential escalation by Hezbollah and its partners in the region. Perhaps this scenario is the closest to the influence of the electoral factor in the United States of America, as Netanyahu’s visit at the invitation of the Republican majority and his meeting with Trump was a political maneuver to pressure the Democrats and President Biden to facilitate the sending of more military aid to Israel.

It is worth noting here that the Zionist lobby's support for any candidate in the US elections at various levels is considered a crucial matter, and therefore Netanyahu's visit falls within the circle of political blackmail to obtain the largest amount of aid, which is expected to increase very significantly before the end of President Biden's term.

The statements of the US Secretary of Defense, which we referred to in the introduction to this article, in which he pledged to defend Israel if the situation on the ground escalated, can be read within the framework of Washington’s support and its well-known commitment to Israel’s security, but this does not mean in any way engaging in the war directly. The Israeli strike that took place yesterday should be viewed as an extension and reflection of the political conflict between the two parties: the Republican and the Democratic, in the context of the electoral competition that America is witnessing.

Third: The scenario of entering directly into any future war

This scenario is based on the principle that the United States will intervene militarily and directly to defend Israel, as happened in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967 and 1973. This scenario is unlikely, even if there is an American commitment to support Israel’s security, due to what can be called Washington’s strategic options, at the forefront of which is the strategy of shifting towards East Asia under the pretext of containing China. Interest in this trend began during the era of former President Barack Obama, who developed the strategy of shifting towards East Asia (2009-2017).

East Asia Shift Strategy

US President Barack Obama's East Asia Strategy (2009-2017) represents a radical shift in US foreign policy, shifting focus from the Middle East and Europe to East Asia.

Through this shift, the United States sought to build relations with East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, especially those surrounding China, to confront its rise as a great power. Work was done to strengthen bilateral security alliances and form a large-scale military presence, and the concept of “pivot to Asia” or “Asia-Pacific” was later replaced by the “Indo-Pacific Strategy.”

This strategy, the foundations of which were laid by Obama, has not changed until now, despite the change in American administrations, based on the fact that the essence of this strategy is the necessity of focusing on China and besieging it.

Therefore, Washington has no choice but to engage in any comprehensive war created by Israel or any regional party, despite its absolute commitment to Israel’s security. The United States’ focus in the short and long term will be directed towards the Asian continent in general and towards China in particular. Washington will not allow Beijing to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake that it controls as it pleases, even if it requires war and a military confrontation with China to prevent that from happening, especially since control of that region is what will determine who leads the world in the current century.

Therefore, no matter the extent of the escalation, Washington will not engage in a large-scale war in the Middle East in defense of Israel at the expense of its global geopolitical future. If such a war were to break out, I believe that Washington would be prepared to travel to Tehran and sit with the Supreme Leader if necessary. Another matter in the same context is that Iran has a significant influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. What would force it to enter a war to lose this influence that has grown as a result of the American policy that has turned its back on the Middle East?

Conclusion

As for Washington’s options regarding the repercussions of this event, it will not wage war for Israel this time, because it has no interest, and the same is true for Iran. Therefore, the war could escalate in any way without America and Iran being its two parties.

Another factor preventing this escalation from turning into a full-scale confrontation is the Israelis’ awareness that Hezbollah has succeeded in developing its capabilities significantly compared to what it was in 2006. According to Israeli intelligence estimates, Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile is more than seven times larger than Hamas’s. In addition to hundreds of attack drones, this stockpile includes about 130,000 to 150,000 rockets and missiles, including hundreds of ballistic missiles that can reach targets deep inside Tel Aviv.