Foreign Policy: Will America Assassinate Putin? | Politics

The United States has previously overthrown leaders of governments it considers hostile, and in a report for Foreign Policy, former CIA officer Douglas London assesses the possibility that Washington will assassinate Russian President Vladimir Putin, or organize a coup against him.

According to the author's analysis, the United States prefers the continuation of the status quo, and sees Putin as an adversary whose actions are easy to predict, which makes dealing with him easy, and making overthrowing him a risky option. Especially since the ruling elite in Russia will see Putin's assassination as an existential threat to them, which may push them to take hostile steps towards the West.

Douglas noted the importance of evaluating such a decision when Putin's visit to North Korea in June of this year raised questions about whether the United States should exploit the president's absence and stage a coup against him.

The author finds that taking a decision to get rid of Putin will not achieve the desired goals, but will cause chaos and tension inside and outside Russia, will increase the hostility of the next government towards the United States, and will lead to a deterioration in regional and international security stability.

U.S. plans to overthrow leaders of hostile states often backfired, including its support for military coups to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973.

It is important to consider Russia's nuclear weapons, Douglas said, as any instability in Russian leadership could increase the risk of their use or threat.

These risks make it difficult to justify any attempt or decision to get rid of Putin, even if there is a chance of successfully doing so.

Difficulty of assassination or coup from within

Douglas reiterates his view that the United States, which usually relies on internal elements to achieve its goals, will not find allies in Russia’s political elite who are capable of overthrowing Putin or organizing his assassination. The Russian political system relies on a small group of security and military elites who have strong ties to the president.

Alexander Bortnikov, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the Soviet KGB, is considered Putin's closest confidant, and Douglas rules out the possibility that he will turn against him. Even if he did, Bortnikov's perspective on politics and the West would be no different from Putin's, he says.

The FSB's director-general is dedicated to supporting Putin's rule by suppressing dissent and ensuring the president's policies are implemented, Douglas said.

The head of the National Guard, Viktor Zolotov, owes his position and influence to Putin. He was his former bodyguard, and the president has lavished his family—as he has done with other members of the elite—with money, land, and gifts. The National Guard has broad powers to suppress protests and ensure internal security.

The head of the presidential security service, Dmitry Kochnev, has also shown no political ambitions, devoting himself and his 50,000-strong security service to protecting the president. Douglas points out that even if Kochnev wanted to assassinate the president, he would have to get the support of other elites first.